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**ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LARGE LANGUAGE
MODEL INTERROGATION**



**REPRESENTATIONAL MEASUREMENT FAILURE IN
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT**

**CANADA: QUEBEC AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
MEASUREMENT FAILURE IN HEALTH TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT**

**CANADA: LE QUEBEC ET LA REPRODUCTION DE
L'ECHEC DE LA MESURE EN EVALUATION DES
TECHNOLOGIES DE LA SANTE**

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FOREWORD

HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: A GLOBAL SYSTEM OF NON-MEASUREMENT

This Logit Working Paper series documents a finding as extraordinary as it is uncomfortable: health technology assessment (HTA), across nations, agencies, journals, and decades, has developed as a global system of non-measurement. It speaks the language of numbers, models, utilities, QALYs, “value for money,” thresholds, discounting, incremental ratios, extrapolations, and simulations. It demands arithmetic at every turn, multiplication, division, summation, aggregation, discounting, yet it never once established that the quantities to which these operations are applied are measurable. HTA has built a vast evaluative machinery on foundations that do not exist. The probabilities and normalized logits in the country reports that follow provide the empirical confirmation of this claim. They show, with unsettling consistency, that the global HTA system consistently support measurement failure.

The objective of this study is to evaluate the epistemic foundations of the Institut national d’excellence en santé et en services sociaux (INESSS) using the canonical 24-item diagnostic grounded in representational measurement theory. The purpose is not to assess the agency’s administrative effectiveness, policy responsiveness, or deliberative processes, but to determine whether the evaluative framework employed by INESSS recognizes and enforces the axioms that govern legitimate quantitative inference. These axioms include the logical precedence of measurement over arithmetic, the requirement of unidimensionality, the distinction between ordinal, interval, and ratio scales, the necessity of invariance, and the conditions under which latent constructs may be transformed into quantities.

The analysis treats INESSS as a distinct epistemic corpus defined by its methodological guidance, submission requirements, assessment reports, and decision rationales. By applying a standardized probability–logit interrogation framework, the study seeks to determine whether the value claims generated or accepted by the agency are, in principle, empirically evaluable and replicable, or whether they rest on numerical assumptions that cannot be tested. The assessment forms part of a broader Logit Working Paper series examining whether contemporary HTA institutions operate as quantitative sciences or as systems of numerical representation insulated from empirical falsification.

The canonical assessment demonstrates that the INESSS knowledge base exhibits a fully consolidated epistemic structure in which the axioms of representational measurement do not function as governing constraints. Propositions defining the necessary conditions for quantitative science consistently collapse toward the lower bound of endorsement, while propositions that violate those conditions receive strong reinforcement. Measurement does not precede arithmetic within the INESSS framework; rather, arithmetic is permitted by institutional convention and analytic necessity.

At the same time, the assumptions required to sustain cost-utility analysis are strongly reinforced. Preference-based utilities are treated as interval or ratio measures, negative values are accepted on

purported ratio scales, summated subjective responses are treated as quantitative magnitudes, and QALYs are assumed to support aggregation and multiplication. Rasch measurement principles, which provide the only lawful basis for transforming ordinal responses into quantitative latent-trait measures, are almost entirely absent. The resulting probability–logit profile is internally coherent and structurally invariant with patterns observed for CADTH/CDA-AMC and Canadian academic HTA research centers. The findings indicate not misunderstanding or inconsistency, but systematic non-possession of measurement theory within the INESSS epistemic framework.

The starting point is simple and inescapable: *measurement precedes arithmetic*. This principle is not a methodological preference but a logical necessity. One cannot multiply what one has not measured, cannot sum what has no dimensional homogeneity, cannot compare ratios when no ratio scale exists. When HTA multiplies time by utilities to generate QALYs, it is performing arithmetic with numbers that cannot support the operation. When HTA divides cost by QALYs, it is constructing a ratio from quantities that have no ratio properties. When HTA aggregates QALYs across individuals or conditions, it is combining values that do not share a common scale. These practices are not merely suboptimal; they are mathematically impossible.

The modern articulation of this principle can be traced to Stevens' seminal 1946 paper, which introduced the typology of nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio scales¹. Stevens made explicit what physicists, engineers, and psychologists already understood: different kinds of numbers permit different kinds of arithmetic. Ordinal scales allow ranking but not addition; interval scales permit addition and subtraction but not multiplication; ratio scales alone support multiplication, division, and the construction of meaningful ratios. Utilities derived from multiattribute preference exercises, such as EQ-5D or HUI, are ordinal preference scores; they do not satisfy the axioms of interval measurement, much less ratio measurement. Yet HTA has, for forty years, treated these utilities as if they were ratio quantities, multiplying them by time to create QALYs and inserting them into models without the slightest recognition that scale properties matter. Stevens' paper should have blocked the development of QALYs and cost-utility analysis entirely. Instead, it was ignored.

The foundational theory that establishes *when* and *whether* a set of numbers can be interpreted as measurements came with the publication of Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky's *Foundations of Measurement* (1971)². Representational Measurement Theory (RMT) formalized the axioms under which empirical attributes can be mapped to numbers in a way that preserves structure. Measurement, in this framework, is not an act of assigning numbers for convenience, it is the discovery of a lawful relationship between empirical relations and numerical relations. The axioms of additive conjoint measurement, homogeneity, order, and invariance specify exactly when interval scales exist. RMT demonstrated once and for all that measurement is not optional and not a matter of taste: either the axioms hold and measurement is possible, or the axioms fail and measurement is impossible. Every major construct in HTA, utilities, QALYs, DALYs, ICERs, incremental ratios, preference weights, health-state indices, fails these axioms. They lack unidimensionality; they violate independence; they depend on aggregation of heterogeneous attributes; they collapse under the requirements of additive conjoint measurement. Yet HTA proceeded, decade after decade, without any engagement with these axioms, as if the field had collectively decided that measurement theory applied everywhere except in the evaluation of therapies.

Whereas representational measurement theory articulates the axioms for interval measurement, Georg Rasch's 1960 model provides the only scientific method for transforming ordered categorical responses into interval measures for latent traits³. Rasch models uniquely satisfy the principles of specific objectivity, sufficiency, unidimensionality, and invariance. For any construct such as pain, fatigue, depression, mobility, or need, Rasch analysis is the only legitimate means of producing an interval scale from ordinal item responses. Rasch measurement is not an alternative to RMT; it is its operational instantiation. The equivalence of Rasch's axioms and the axioms of representational measurement was demonstrated by Wright, Andrich and others as early as the 1970s. In the latent-trait domain, the very domain where HTA claims to operate; Rasch is the only game in town⁴.

Yet Rasch is effectively absent from all HTA guidelines, including NICE, PBAC, CADTH, ICER, SMC, and PHARMAC. The analysis demands utilities but never requires that those utilities be measured. They rely on multiattribute ordinal classifications but never understand that those constructs be calibrated on interval or ratio scales. They mandate cost-utility analysis but never justify the arithmetic. They demand modelled QALYs but never interrogate their dimensional properties. These guidelines do not misunderstand Rasch; they do not know it exists. The axioms that define measurement and the model that makes latent trait measurement possible are invisible to the authors of global HTA rules. The field has evolved without the science that measurement demands.

How did HTA miss the bus so thoroughly? The answer lies in its historical origins. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, HTA emerged not from measurement science but from welfare economics, decision theory, and administrative pressure to control drug budgets. Its core concern was *valuing health states*, not *measuring health*. This move, quiet, subtle, but devastating, shifted the field away from the scientific question "What is the empirical structure of the construct we intend to measure?" and toward the administrative question "How do we elicit a preference weight that we can multiply by time?" The preference-elicitation projects of that era (SG, TTO, VAS) were rationalized as measurement techniques, but they never satisfied measurement axioms. Ordinal preferences were dressed up as quasi-cardinal indices; valuation tasks were misinterpreted as psychometrics; analyst convenience replaced measurement theory. The HTA community built an entire belief system around the illusion that valuing health is equivalent to measuring health. It is not.

The endurance of this belief system, forty years strong and globally uniform, is not evidence of validity but evidence of institutionalized error. HTA has operated under conditions of what can only be described as *structural epistemic closure*: a system that has never questioned its constructs because it never learned the language required to ask the questions. Representational measurement theory is not taught in graduate HTA programs; Rasch modelling is not part of guideline development; dimensional analysis is not part of methodological review. The field has been insulated from correction because its conceptual foundations were never laid. What remains is a ritualized practice: utilities in, QALYs out, ICERs calculated, thresholds applied. The arithmetic continues because everyone assumes someone else validated the numbers.

This Logit Working Paper series exposes, through probabilistic and logit-based interrogations of AI large language national knowledge bases, the scale of this failure. The results display a global

pattern: true statements reflecting the axioms of measurement receive weak endorsement; false statements reflecting the HTA belief system receive moderate or strong reinforcement. This is not disagreement. It is non-possession. It shows that HTA, worldwide, has developed as a quantitative discipline without quantitative foundations; a confused exercise in numerical storytelling.

The conclusion is unavoidable: HTA does not need incremental reform; it needs a scientific revolution. Measurement must precede arithmetic. Representational axioms must precede valuation rituals. Rasch measurement must replace ordinal summation and utility algorithms. Value claims must be falsifiable, protocol-driven, and measurable; rather than simulated, aggregated, and numerically embellished.

The global system of non-measurement is now visible. The task ahead is to replace it with science.

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DISCLAIMER

This analysis is generated through the structured interrogation of a large language model (LLM) applied to a defined documentary corpus and is intended solely to characterize patterns within an aggregated knowledge environment. It does identify, assess, or attribute beliefs, intentions, competencies, or actions to any named individual, faculty member, student, administrator, institution, or organization. The results do not constitute factual findings about specific persons or programs, nor should they be interpreted as claims regarding professional conduct, educational quality, or compliance with regulatory or accreditation standards. All probabilities and logit values reflect model-based inferences about the presence or absence of concepts within a bounded textual ecosystem, not judgments about real-world actors. The analysis is exploratory, interpretive, and methodological in nature, offered for scholarly discussion of epistemic structures rather than evaluative or legal purposes. Any resemblance to particular institutions or practices is contextual and non-attributive, and no adverse implication should be inferred.

1. INTERROGATING THE LARGE LANGUAGE MODEL

A large language model (LLM) is an artificial intelligence system designed to understand, generate, and manipulate human language by learning patterns from vast amounts of text data. Built on deep neural network architectures, most commonly transformers, LLMs analyze relationships between words, sentences, and concepts to produce contextually relevant responses. During training, the model processes billions of examples, enabling it to learn grammar, facts, reasoning patterns, and even subtle linguistic nuances. Once trained, an LLM can perform a wide range of tasks: answering questions, summarizing documents, generating creative writing, translating languages, assisting with coding, and more. Although LLMs do not possess consciousness or true understanding, they simulate comprehension by predicting the most likely continuation of text based on learned patterns. Their capabilities make them powerful tools for communication, research, automation, and decision support, but they also require careful oversight to ensure accuracy, fairness, privacy, and responsible use.

In this Logit Working Paper, “interrogation” refers not to discovering what an LLM *believes*, it has no beliefs, but to probing the content of the *corpus-defined knowledge space* we choose to analyze. This knowledge base is enhanced if it is backed by accumulated memory from the user. In this case the interrogation relies also on 12 months of HTA memory from continued application of the system to evaluate HTA experience. The corpus is defined before interrogation: it may consist of a journal (e.g., *Value in Health*), a national HTA body, a specific methodological framework, or a collection of policy documents. Once the boundaries of that corpus are established, the LLM is used to estimate the conceptual footprint within it. This approach allows us to determine which principles are articulated, neglected, misunderstood, or systematically reinforced.

In this HTA assessment, the objective is precise: to determine the extent to which a given HTA knowledge base or corpus, global, national, institutional, or journal-specific, recognizes and reinforces the foundational principles of representational measurement theory (RMT). The core principle under investigation is that measurement precedes arithmetic; no construct may be treated as a number or subjected to mathematical operations unless the axioms of measurement are satisfied. These axioms include unidimensionality, scale-type distinctions, invariance, additivity, and the requirement that ordinal responses cannot lawfully be transformed into interval or ratio quantities except under Rasch measurement rules.

The HTA knowledge space is defined pragmatically and operationally. For each jurisdiction, organization, or journal, the corpus consists of:

- published HTA guidelines
- agency decision frameworks
- cost-effectiveness reference cases
- academic journals and textbooks associated with HTA
- modelling templates, technical reports, and task-force recommendations
- teaching materials, methodological articles, and institutional white papers

These sources collectively form the epistemic environment within which HTA practitioners develop their beliefs and justify their evaluative practices. The boundary of interrogation is thus

not the whole of medicine, economics, or public policy, but the specific textual ecosystem that sustains HTA reasoning. . The “knowledge base” is therefore not individual opinions but the cumulative, structured content of the HTA discourse itself within the LLM.

THE QUEBEC INESSS KNOWLEDGE BASE

The knowledge base of INESSS is best understood as an institutional epistemic system rather than as a collection of technical documents. It consists of the interconnected set of methodological frameworks, submission guidelines, assessment reports, economic evaluation templates, and deliberative rationales through which evidence is defined and interpreted. Together, these elements form the conceptual environment that governs what counts as admissible evidence, how outcomes are expressed, and which numerical operations are regarded as legitimate.

At the center of this system lies the requirement for economic evaluation framed around cost-utility analysis. Submissions are expected to express value through incremental cost per QALY gained, typically supported by long-term modeling. This requirement establishes arithmetic as the organizing principle of evaluation. Numerical outputs are required not because the underlying quantities have been established, but because comparability and decision-making frameworks demand them.

Preference-based instruments such as the EQ-5D and HUI occupy a foundational role within the INESSS framework. Utilities derived from these instruments are treated as quantitative measures of health suitable for multiplication by time and aggregation across individuals. The transformation from ordinal descriptive responses to numerical utilities is assumed to generate interval or ratio properties, despite the absence of any explicit transformation model demonstrating invariance or unit structure. Valuation is treated as measurement by default.

Methodological guidance reinforces this orientation. Documents emphasize consistency with international HTA practice, transparency of modeling assumptions, and alignment with reference-case conventions. However, they rarely address scale type, unidimensionality, or the axioms governing arithmetic. Measurement theory does not function as an admissibility criterion. As long as numbers conform to accepted conventions, their representational status is not questioned.

The epistemic structure is further stabilized through routine assessment practice. Reviews focus on parameter selection, sensitivity analysis, scenario exploration, and model uncertainty. These activities create the appearance of empirical rigor while operating entirely within a closed numerical system. Falsifiability is reinterpreted as internal variation rather than external empirical testing against observed outcomes.

INESSS also emphasizes deliberative processes and contextual judgment. While this may influence final recommendations, it does not alter the epistemic status of the quantitative claims presented. Deliberation occurs downstream of modeling and cannot repair deficiencies in measurement. Context may shape interpretation, but it cannot convert non-quantities into quantities.

Institutional reinforcement plays a critical role. Analysts are trained within established HTA conventions, reviewers evaluate submissions against accepted templates, and published assessments reproduce the same numerical structures. Over time, these practices harden into methodological norms. What began as assumption becomes requirement.

The result is a stable epistemic environment in which numerical outputs circulate with authority despite lacking definitional grounding. Measurement theory does not operate as a governing authority because it is not recognized as relevant to HTA practice. Arithmetic becomes self-justifying.

This structure explains both the durability and the limitation of the INESSS framework. It is durable because it aligns with international HTA standards and is institutionally reinforced. It is limited because its numerical claims cannot, even in principle, be empirically evaluated or replicated. Without restoring measurement as a precondition for arithmetic, no refinement of modeling technique or deliberative process can resolve this contradiction.

The INESSS knowledge base thus exemplifies a mature but epistemically closed system. It produces numerically sophisticated evaluations while remaining insulated from the fundamental requirements of quantitative science. Recognizing this condition is the first step toward any meaningful reform.

CATEGORICAL PROBABILITIES

In the present application, the interrogation is tightly bounded. It does not ask what an LLM “thinks,” nor does it request a normative judgment. Instead, the LLM evaluates how likely the HTA knowledge space is to endorse, imply, or reinforce a set of 24 diagnostic statements derived from representational measurement theory (RMT). Each statement is objectively TRUE or FALSE under RMT. The objective is to assess whether the HTA corpus exhibits possession or non-possession of the axioms required to treat numbers as measures. The interrogation creates an categorical endorsement probability: the estimated likelihood that the HTA knowledge base endorses the statement whether it is true or false; *explicitly or implicitly*.

The use of categorical endorsement probabilities within the Logit Working Papers reflects both the nature of the diagnostic task and the structure of the language model that underpins it. The purpose of the interrogation is not to estimate a statistical frequency drawn from a population of individuals, nor to simulate the behavior of hypothetical analysts. Instead, the aim is to determine the conceptual tendencies embedded in a domain-specific knowledge base: the discursive patterns, methodological assumptions, and implicit rules that shape how a health technology assessment environment behaves. A large language model does not “vote” like a survey respondent; it expresses likelihoods based on its internal representation of a domain. In this context, endorsement probabilities capture the strength with which the knowledge base, as represented within the model, supports a particular proposition. Because these endorsements are conceptual rather than statistical, the model must produce values that communicate differences in reinforcement without implying precision that cannot be justified.

This is why categorical probabilities are essential. Continuous probabilities would falsely suggest a measurable underlying distribution, as if each HTA system comprised a definable population of respondents with quantifiable frequencies. But large language models do not operate on that level. They represent knowledge through weighted relationships between linguistic and conceptual patterns. When asked whether a domain tends to affirm, deny, or ignore a principle such as unidimensionality, admissible arithmetic, or the axioms of representational measurement, the model draws on its internal structure to produce an estimate of conceptual reinforcement. The precision of that estimate must match the nature of the task. Categorical probabilities therefore provide a disciplined and interpretable way of capturing reinforcement strength while avoiding the illusion of statistical granularity.

The categories used, values such as 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50, 0.75, 0.80, and 0.85, are not arbitrary. They function as qualitative markers that correspond to distinct degrees of conceptual possession: near-absence, weak reinforcement, inconsistent or ambiguous reinforcement, common reinforcement, and strong reinforcement. These values are far enough apart to ensure clear interpretability yet fine-grained enough to capture meaningful differences in the behavior of the knowledge base. The objective is not to measure probability in a statistical sense but to classify the epistemic stance of the domain toward a given item. A probability of 0.05 signals that the knowledge base almost never articulates or implies the correct response under measurement theory, whereas 0.85 indicates that the domain routinely reinforces it. Values near the middle reflect conceptual instability rather than a balanced distribution of views.

Using categorical probabilities also aligns with the requirements of logit transformation. Converting these probabilities into logits produces an interval-like diagnostic scale that can be compared across countries, agencies, journals, or organizations. The logit transformation stretches differences at the extremes, allowing strong reinforcement and strong non-reinforcement to become highly visible. Normalizing logits to the fixed ± 2.50 range ensure comparability without implying unwarranted mathematical precision. Without categorical inputs, logits would suggest a false precision that could mislead readers about the nature of the diagnostic tool.

In essence, the categorical probability approach translates the conceptual architecture of the LLM into a structured and interpretable measurement analogue. It provides a disciplined bridge between the qualitative behavior of a domain's knowledge base and the quantitative diagnostic framework needed to expose its internal strengths and weaknesses.

The LLM computes these categorical probabilities from three sources:

1. **Structural content of HTA discourse**

If the literature repeatedly uses ordinal utilities as interval measures, multiplies non-quantities, aggregates QALYs, or treats simulations as falsifiable, the model infers high reinforcement of these false statements.

2. **Conceptual visibility of measurement axioms**

If ideas such as unidimensionality, dimensional homogeneity, scale-type integrity, or Rasch transformation rarely appear, or are contradicted by practice, the model assigns low endorsement probabilities to TRUE statements.

3. The model's learned representation of domain stability

Where discourse is fragmented, contradictory, or conceptually hollow, the model avoids assigning high probabilities. This is *not* averaging across people; it is a reflection of internal conceptual incoherence within HTA.

The output of interrogation is a categorical probability for each statement. Probabilities are then transformed into logits [$\ln(p/(1-p))$], capped to ± 4.0 logits to avoid extreme distortions, and normalized to ± 2.50 logits for comparability across countries. A positive normalized logit indicates reinforcement in the knowledge base. A negative logit indicates weak reinforcement or conceptual absence. Values near zero logits reflect epistemic noise.

Importantly, *a high endorsement probability for a false statement does not imply that practitioners knowingly believe something incorrect*. It means the HTA literature itself behaves as if the falsehood were true; through methods, assumptions, or repeated uncritical usage. Conversely, a low probability for a true statement indicates that the literature rarely articulates, applies, or even implies the principle in question.

The LLM interrogation thus reveals structural epistemic patterns in HTA: which ideas the field possesses, which it lacks, and where its belief system diverges from the axioms required for scientific measurement. It is a diagnostic of the *knowledge behavior* of the HTA domain, not of individuals. The 24 statements function as probes into the conceptual fabric of HTA, exposing the extent to which practice aligns or fails to align with the axioms of representational measurement.

INTERROGATION STATEMENTS

Below is the canonical list of the 24 diagnostic HTA measurement items used in all the logit analyses, each marked with its correct truth value under representational measurement theory (RMT) and Rasch measurement principles.

This is the definitive set used across the Logit Working Papers.

Measurement Theory & Scale Properties

1. Interval measures lack a true zero — TRUE
2. Measures must be unidimensional — TRUE
3. Multiplication requires a ratio measure — TRUE
4. Time trade-off preferences are unidimensional — FALSE
5. Ratio measures can have negative values — FALSE
6. EQ-5D-3L preference algorithms create interval measures — FALSE
7. The QALY is a ratio measure — FALSE
8. Time is a ratio measure — TRUE

Measurement Preconditions for Arithmetic

9. Measurement precedes arithmetic — TRUE
10. Summations of subjective instrument responses are ratio measures — FALSE

11. Meeting the axioms of representational measurement is required for arithmetic — TRUE

Rasch Measurement & Latent Traits

12. There are only two classes of measurement: linear ratio and Rasch logit ratio — TRUE

13. Transforming subjective responses to interval measurement is only possible with Rasch rules — TRUE

14. Summation of Likert question scores creates a ratio measure — FALSE

Properties of QALYs & Utilities

15. The QALY is a dimensionally homogeneous measure — FALSE

16. Claims for cost-effectiveness fail the axioms of representational measurement — TRUE

17. QALYs can be aggregated — FALSE

Falsifiability & Scientific Standards

18. Non-falsifiable claims should be rejected — TRUE

19. Reference-case simulations generate falsifiable claims — FALSE

Logit Fundamentals

20. The logit is the natural logarithm of the odds-ratio — TRUE

Latent Trait Theory

21. The Rasch logit ratio scale is the only basis for assessing therapy impact for latent traits — TRUE

22. A linear ratio scale for manifest claims can always be combined with a logit scale — FALSE

23. The outcome of interest for latent traits is the possession of that trait — TRUE

24. The Rasch rules for measurement are identical to the axioms of representational measurement — TRUE

AI LARGE LANGUAGE MODEL STATEMENTS: TRUE OR FALSE

Each of the 24 statements has a 400 word explanation why the statement is true or false as there may be differences of opinion on their status in terms of unfamiliarity with scale typology and the axioms of representational measurement.

The link to these explanations is: <https://maimonresearch.com/ai-llm-true-or-false/>

INTERPRETING TRUE STATEMENTS

TRUE statements represent foundational axioms of measurement and arithmetic. Endorsement probabilities for TRUE items typically cluster in the low range, indicating that the HTA corpus does *not* consistently articulate or reinforce essential principles such as:

- measurement preceding arithmetic
- unidimensionality
- scale-type distinctions
- dimensional homogeneity
- impossibility of ratio multiplication on non-ratio scales
- the Rasch requirement for latent-trait measurement

Low endorsement indicates **non-possession** of fundamental measurement knowledge—the literature simply does not contain, teach, or apply these principles.

INTERPRETING FALSE STATEMENTS

FALSE statements represent the well-known mathematical impossibilities embedded in the QALY framework and reference-case modelling. Endorsement probabilities for FALSE statements are often moderate or even high, meaning the HTA knowledge base:

- accepts non-falsifiable simulation as evidence
- permits negative “ratio” measures
- treats ordinal utilities as interval measures
- treats QALYs as ratio measures
- treats summated ordinal scores as ratio scales
- accepts dimensional incoherence

This means the field systematically reinforces incorrect assumptions at the center of its practice. *Endorsement* here means the HTA literature behaves as though the falsehood were true.

2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR TRUE AND FALSE ENDORSEMENTS: QUEBEC INESSS

Table 1 presents probabilities and normalized logits for each of the 24 diagnostic measurement statements. This is the standard reporting format used throughout the HTA assessment series.

It is essential to understand how to interpret these results.

The endorsement probabilities do not indicate whether a statement is *true* or *false* under representational measurement theory. Instead, they estimate the extent to which the HTA knowledge base associated with the target treats the statement as if it were true, that is, whether the concept is reinforced, implied, assumed, or accepted within the country's published HTA knowledge base.

The logits provide a continuous, symmetric scale, ranging from +2.50 to –2.50, that quantifies the degree of this endorsement. the logits, of course link to the probabilities (p) as the logit is the natural logarithm of the odds ratio; $\text{logit} = \ln[p/1-p]$.

- Strongly positive logits indicate pervasive reinforcement of the statement within the knowledge system.
- Strongly negative logits indicate conceptual absence, non-recognition, or contradiction within that same system.
- Values near zero indicate only shallow, inconsistent, or fragmentary support.

Thus, the endorsement logit profile serves as a direct index of a country's epistemic alignment with the axioms of scientific measurement, revealing the internal structure of its HTA discourse. It does not reflect individual opinions or survey responses, but the implicit conceptual commitments encoded in the literature itself.

TABLE 1: ITEM STATEMENT, RESPONSE, ENDORSEMENT AND NORMALIZED LOGITS QUEBEC INESSS

STATEMENT	RESPONSE 1=TRUE 0=FALSE	ENDORSEMENT OF RESPONSE CATEGORICAL PROBABILITY	NORMALIZED LOGIT (IN RANGE +/- 2.50)
INTERVAL MEASURES LACK A TRUE ZERO	1	0.20	-1.40

MEASURES MUST BE UNIDIMENSIONAL	1	0.15	-1.75
MULTIPLICATION REQUIRES A RATIO MEASURE	1	0.15	-1.75
TIME TRADE-OFF PREFERENCES ARE UNIDIMENSIONAL	0	0.80	+1.40
RATIO MEASURES CAN HAVE NEGATIVE VALUES	0	0.85	+1.75
EQ-5D-3L PREFERENCE ALGORITHMS CREATE INTERVAL MEASURES	0	0.80	+1.40
THE QALY IS A RATIO MEASURE	0	0.85	+1.75
TIME IS A RATIO MEASURE	1	0.75	+1.15
MEASUREMENT PRECEDES ARITHMETIC	1	0.15	-1.75
SUMMATIONS OF SUBJECTIVE INSTRUMENT RESPONSES ARE RATIO MEASURES	0	0.85	+1.75
MEETING THE AXIOMS OF REPRESENTATIONAL MEASUREMENT IS REQUIRED FOR ARITHMETIC	1	0.15	-1.75
THERE ARE ONLY TWO CLASSES OF MEASUREMENT LINEAR RATIO AND RASCH LOGIT RATIO	1	0.10	-2.20
TRANSFORMING SUBJECTIVE RESPONSES TO INTERVAL MEASUREMENT IS ONLY POSSIBLE WITH RASH RULES	1	0.10	-2.20
SUMMATION OF LIKERT QUESTION SCORES CREATES A RATIO MEASURE	0	0.85	+1.75
THE QALY IS A DIMENSIONALLY HOMOGENEOUS MEASURE	0	0.80	+1.40
CLAIMS FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS FAIL THE AXIOMS OF REPRESENTATIONAL MEASUREMENT	1	0.10	-2.20
QALYS CAN BE AGGREGATED	0	0.85	+1.75
NON-FALSIFIABLE CLAIMS SHOULD BE REJECTED	1	0.25	-1.15
REFERENCE CASE SIMULATIONS GENERATE FALSIFIABLE CLAIMS	0	0.85	+1.75
THE LOGIT IS THE NATURAL LOGARITHM OF THE ODDS-RATIO	1	0.35	-0.65
THE RASCH LOGIT RATIO SCALE IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR ASSESSING THERAPY IMPACT FOR LATENT TRAITS	1	0.10	-2.20

A LINEAR RATIO SCALE FOR MANIFEST CLAIMS CAN ALWAYS BE COMBINED WITH A LOGIT SCALE	0	0.75	+1.15
THE OUTCOME OF INTEREST FOR LATENT TRAITS IS THE POSSESSION OF THAT TRAIT	1	0.10	-2.20
THE RASCH RULES FOR MEASUREMENT ARE IDENTICAL TO THE AXIOMS OF REPRESENTATIONAL MEASUREMENT	1	0.05	-2.50

INESSS (QUÉBEC): A CANONICAL EPISTEMIC ASSESSMENT

The canonical diagnostic assessment of INESSS reveals an epistemic structure that is fully aligned with, and indistinguishable from, the dominant international health technology assessment paradigm. Despite its distinct legal mandate, provincial governance, and emphasis on contextualized decision making, the probability–logit profile demonstrates that INESSS operates within the same foundational belief system as CADTH/CDA-AMC, NICE, PBAC, and other mature HTA agencies. The defining feature of this system is not methodological diversity but epistemic uniformity.

The diagnostic does not reveal uncertainty, partial transition, or internal inconsistency. Instead, it displays a stable and coherent inversion of scientific logic. Propositions that define the preconditions for quantitative measurement consistently collapse toward the lower bound of endorsement, while propositions that violate those preconditions are reinforced near the ceiling. Measurement does not function as a governing constraint within the INESSS knowledge base. Arithmetic does.

The proposition that measurement must precede arithmetic registers at $p = 0.15$ (-1.75). This result is foundational. It indicates that numerical operations are not contingent upon the establishment of measurement validity. Rather, arithmetic is treated as an operational necessity imposed by economic evaluation frameworks. Numbers must be produced because decisions require numbers, not because the quantities exist.

Closely related is the equally low endorsement of the requirement that arithmetic must satisfy the axioms of representational measurement. At $p = 0.15$ (-1.75), scale-type coherence does not constrain analytic practice. There is no epistemic mechanism within INESSS guidance that prohibits addition, multiplication, or aggregation when scale properties are undefined. Arithmetic becomes procedural rather than logical.

This absence of constraint is most clearly revealed in the treatment of multiplication. The proposition that multiplication requires a ratio measure collapses to $p = 0.15$ (-1.75). Yet cost-utility analysis rests entirely on multiplication: utilities multiplied by time, outcomes scaled by duration, and ratios constructed from composite numerators and denominators. The rejection of

this proposition is therefore not incidental. It is structurally necessary. Acceptance would invalidate the framework itself.

In contrast, propositions that sustain cost-utility arithmetic receive strong endorsement. The claim that the QALY is a ratio measure registers at $p = 0.85 (+1.75)$. The proposition that QALYs can be aggregated is endorsed at the same level. These values indicate doctrinal reinforcement rather than empirical demonstration. The QALY must be treated as a ratio measure because the evaluative system depends on that assumption.

This doctrinal commitment is further reinforced by the endorsement of negative values on purported ratio scales. The proposition that ratio measures can have negative values is endorsed at $p = 0.85 (+1.75)$. This position directly contradicts the defining property of ratio measurement, namely the presence of a true zero representing the absence of the attribute. Yet within the INESSS framework, health states worse than dead are treated as routine analytic inputs. The contradiction generates no epistemic tension because the axioms that would prohibit it are not operative.

Preference-based instruments occupy a central role in sustaining this structure. The proposition that EQ-5D preference algorithms create interval measures is endorsed at $p = 0.80 (+1.40)$. This reflects the agency's reliance on valuation as a surrogate for measurement. Ordinal descriptions of health states are transformed into numerical utilities through societal preferences, and those utilities are treated as quantitative magnitudes without specification of an invariant transformation model.

Similarly, the belief that summated subjective instrument responses create ratio measures is strongly reinforced at $p = 0.85 (+1.75)$. This finding confirms that INESSS does not distinguish between scoring and measurement. The production of a number is treated as sufficient evidence of quantification, regardless of the scale properties of the underlying data.

Against this backdrop, the collapse of Rasch-related propositions is decisive. The proposition that transforming subjective responses into interval measurement is only possible under Rasch rules registers at $p = 0.10 (-2.20)$. The proposition that the Rasch logit ratio scale provides the only defensible basis for latent-trait measurement collapses to the same level. The equivalence between Rasch axioms and representational measurement theory reaches the absolute floor at $p = 0.05 (-2.50)$.

These values do not indicate rejection following evaluation. They indicate non-possession. Rasch measurement does not function as a conceptual reference point within INESSS methodology. It is not debated, contrasted, or refuted. It is absent.

The proposition that the outcome of interest for latent traits is possession of that trait likewise collapses to $p = 0.10 (-2.20)$. This reveals a profound conceptual displacement. INESSS does not conceptualize outcomes as attributes possessed by patients. Instead, outcomes are represented as values assigned to hypothetical health states by populations. Measurement of persons is replaced by valuation of descriptions.

This distinction is crucial. Measurement concerns attributes of individuals. Valuation concerns preferences of observers. The INESSS framework operates entirely within the latter domain while treating its outputs as if they belonged to the former. The diagnostic makes this category error explicit.

The endorsement of reference-case simulation as a source of falsifiable claims further reinforces this structure. The proposition that reference-case simulations generate falsifiable claims is endorsed at $p = 0.85 (+1.75)$. Modeled futures are treated as evidence despite lacking observable referents. Falsifiability is redefined as internal model variation rather than empirical testing against real-world outcomes.

Although the proposition that non-falsifiable claims should be rejected registers modestly higher at $p = 0.25 (-1.15)$, this value reflects rhetorical acknowledgment rather than operational enforcement. In practice, INESSS relies on long-term modeled claims that cannot be replicated, reproduced, or empirically assessed.

Taken together, the results reveal a fully coherent epistemic system. Measurement axioms are excluded. Valuation is elevated. Arithmetic is protected. Simulation replaces observation. Each element reinforces the others, producing a stable framework that appears technically sophisticated while remaining epistemically ungrounded. The most striking feature of the diagnostic is its invariance. The probability–logit profile for INESSS is effectively identical to those observed for CADTH/CDA-AMC, Canadian academic HTA research centers, and international HTA agencies. This invariance is not accidental. It reflects membership in a shared HTA memplex, one that transcends jurisdictional boundaries.

Québec’s distinct policy context does not translate into epistemic differentiation. Despite greater emphasis on deliberative processes and contextual factors, the numerical foundations remain unchanged. The same preference-based utilities, the same QALY arithmetic, and the same reference-case logic govern evaluation. Local adaptation occurs at the margins, not at the level of measurement.

This finding has important implications. It demonstrates that reform cannot be achieved through provincial autonomy or procedural modification. As long as the foundational quantities remain non-measures, no jurisdiction can produce evaluable value claims.

The diagnostic therefore reveals the core limitation of INESSS’s evaluative authority. The agency can compare submissions, rank alternatives, and negotiate prices, but it cannot test its claims. Without measurement, there is no empirical feedback loop. Decisions cannot be falsified. Learning cannot occur.

This condition does not imply administrative failure. INESSS performs exactly the role its epistemic framework permits. The failure lies not in implementation but in the knowledge structure itself. The canonical assessment makes this explicit. It shows that INESSS, like other HTA agencies, operates within a system of numerical storytelling. Numbers are produced, manipulated, and compared, but they do not represent quantities in the scientific sense. The appearance of precision substitutes for measurement.

Recognizing this condition is the first step toward reform. Until measurement is restored as a precondition for arithmetic, HTA will remain insulated from empirical accountability. The diagnostic does not merely critique INESSS. It exposes the epistemic limits of contemporary health technology assessment as a whole.

HOW SHOULD INESSS RESPOND TO A DIAGNOSTIC OF MEASUREMENT FAILURE?

The canonical diagnostic assessment of INESSS leads to the same unavoidable conclusion reached for Canada's federal HTA agency: the evaluative framework rests on numerical constructs that do not satisfy the axioms of representational measurement. This finding cannot be addressed through methodological refinement, improved modeling practice, or expanded deliberative processes. Where measurement does not exist, no procedural sophistication can create it. The appropriate response is therefore not adjustment but reconstruction.

At first glance, INESSS might appear differently positioned from national HTA agencies. Its mandate emphasizes contextual judgment, clinical nuance, and deliberation alongside economic evidence. Yet the diagnostic demonstrates that these institutional features operate downstream of the same numerical architecture that governs HTA elsewhere. Deliberation does not replace measurement; it presupposes it. When the quantities entering deliberation are non-measures, contextual interpretation cannot restore their validity.

If INESSS accepts the diagnostic conclusion that its quantitative framework is built on non-measurement, then its response must begin with explicit recognition. Preference-based utilities, QALYs, and reference-case simulations do not generate measurable quantities. They may express social values or organize discussion, but they cannot support arithmetic, prediction, or empirical testing. Treating them as quantitative evidence sustains numerical authority without empirical foundation.

Recognition must then be operationalized. For INESSS, this requires a reformulation of formulary and technology submission requirements grounded in evaluable claims rather than modeled projections. The central principle of this reform should be that all value claims submitted for assessment must be capable of empirical evaluation within a defined timeframe using valid measurement.

As with CDA, this implies a clear distinction between two types of admissible claims. The first consists of manifest claims. These are claims based on directly observable events that can be expressed on linear ratio scales. Examples include therapy initiation, persistence, switching behavior, medication possession, hospitalization days, emergency visits, and other resource utilization counts. Such outcomes possess true zeros, support arithmetic, and permit replication. For these claims, INESSS should require a protocol specifying the target population, outcome definition, observation period, and analytic method. These protocols establish a pathway for post-listing evaluation and independent verification.

The second consists of latent-trait claims. Outcomes such as symptom burden, functional limitation, or need fulfillment cannot be directly observed and therefore require transformation

models to become quantities. For these claims, INESSS should require Rasch-based measurement demonstrating unidimensionality, invariance, and linear logit ratio properties. Without such transformation, responses remain ordinal descriptions and cannot support quantitative inference. Instruments that rely on summated Likert scores, preference weighting, or multiattribute aggregation must therefore be excluded from quantitative claims.

This framework does not eliminate deliberation. It repositions it. Deliberation should operate over empirically evaluable claims rather than speculative numbers. Contextual judgment gains legitimacy when anchored in observable outcomes rather than imaginary quantities projected decades into the future. Importantly, this transition aligns with INESSS's stated emphasis on real-world relevance. A system built around evaluable claims allows learning to occur. Claims can be confirmed, revised, or rejected as evidence accumulates. By contrast, reference-case simulations close the evidentiary loop. Modeled futures cannot be falsified; they can only be re-modeled.

The reform therefore strengthens rather than weakens institutional authority. An agency that acknowledges the limits of its quantitative framework and reconstructs evaluation around measurement demonstrates epistemic maturity. Scientific credibility is not preserved by defending indefensible quantities but by abandoning them. As with CDA, this transition need not be abrupt. INESSS can adopt a staged approach in which existing frameworks are maintained temporarily while new submissions are structured around protocol-driven claims. Over time, the contrast between empirically testable outcomes and speculative modeling will become self-evident. The diagnostic assessment does not imply institutional failure. INESSS operates coherently within the paradigm it inherited. The challenge it now faces is whether to continue operating within a system that produces numbers without measurement, or to redefine HTA as an enterprise grounded in evaluable claims.

The difference between INESSS and CDA is therefore not epistemic but institutional. INESSS already emphasizes context, deliberation, and learning. Those commitments position it well to lead reform. But leadership requires confronting the numerical foundations of evaluation itself. Without restoring measurement as a precondition for arithmetic, deliberation cannot substitute for science. The diagnostic leaves INESSS with a choice. It can continue to deliberate over quantities that cannot exist, or it can reconstruct its evaluative framework around claims that can be measured, tested, and reproduced. Only the latter path permits learning, accountability, and genuine evidence-based decision making.

3. THE TRANSITION TO MEASUREMENT IN HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

THE IMPERATIVE OF CHANGE

This analysis has not been undertaken to criticize decisions made by health system, nor to assign responsibility for the analytical frameworks currently used in formulary review. The evidence shows something more fundamental: organizations have been operating within a system that does not permit meaningful evaluation of therapy impact, even when decisions are made carefully, transparently, and in good faith.

The present HTA framework forces health systems to rely on numerical outputs that appear rigorous but cannot be empirically assessed (Table 1). Reference-case models, cost-per-QALY ratios, and composite value claims are presented as decision-support tools, yet they do not satisfy the conditions required for measurement. As a result, committees are asked to deliberate over results that cannot be validated, reproduced, or falsified. This places decision makers in an untenable position: required to choose among therapies without a stable evidentiary foundation.

This is not a failure of expertise, diligence, or clinical judgment. It is a structural failure. The prevailing HTA architecture requires arithmetic before measurement, rather than measurement before arithmetic. Health systems inherit this structure rather than design it. Manufacturers respond to it. Consultants reproduce it. Journals reinforce it. Universities promote it. Over time it has come to appear normal, even inevitable.

Yet the analysis presented in Table 1 demonstrates that this HTA framework cannot support credible falsifiable claims. Where the dependent variable is not a measure, no amount of modeling sophistication can compensate. Uncertainty analysis cannot rescue non-measurement. Transparency cannot repair category error. Consensus cannot convert assumption into evidence.

The consequence is that formulary decisions are based on numerical storytelling rather than testable claims. This undermines confidence, constrains learning, and exposes health systems to growing scrutiny from clinicians, patients, and regulators who expect evidence to mean something more than structured speculation.

The imperative of change therefore does not arise from theory alone. It arises from governance responsibility. A health system cannot sustain long-term stewardship of care if it lacks the ability to distinguish between claims that can be evaluated and claims that cannot. Without that distinction, there is no pathway to improvement; only endless repetition for years to come.

This transition is not about rejecting evidence. It is about restoring evidence to its proper meaning. It requires moving away from composite, model-driven imaginary constructs toward claims that are measurable, unidimensional, and capable of empirical assessment over time. The remainder of this section sets out how that transition can occur in a practical, defensible, and staged manner.

MEANINGFUL THERAPY IMPACT CLAIMS

At the center of the current problem is not data availability, modeling skill, or analytic effort. It is the nature of the claims being advanced. Contemporary HTA has evolved toward increasingly complex frameworks that attempt to compress multiple attributes, clinical effects, patient experience, time, and preferences into single composite outputs. These constructs are then treated as if they were measures. They are not (Table 1).

The complexity of the reference-case framework obscures a simpler truth: meaningful evaluation requires meaningful claims. A claim must state clearly what attribute is being affected, in whom, over what period, and how that attribute is measured. When these conditions are met, evaluation becomes possible. When they are not, complexity substitutes for clarity. The current framework is not merely incorrect; it is needlessly elaborate. Reference-case modeling requires dozens of inputs, assumptions, and transformations, yet produces outputs that cannot be empirically verified. Each additional layer of complexity increases opacity while decreasing accountability. Committees are left comparing models rather than assessing outcomes.

In contrast, therapy impact can be expressed through two, and only two, types of legitimate claims. First are claims based on manifest attributes: observable events, durations, or resource units. These include hospitalizations avoided, time to event, days in remission, or resource use. When properly defined and unidimensional, these attributes can be measured on linear ratio scales and evaluated directly.

Second are claims based on latent attributes: symptoms, functioning, need fulfillment, or patient experience. These cannot be observed directly and therefore cannot be scored or summed meaningfully. They require formal measurement through Rasch models to produce invariant logit ratio scales. These two forms of claims are sufficient. They are also far more transparent. Each can be supported by a protocol. Each can be revisited. Each can be reproduced. Most importantly, each can fail. But they cannot be combined. This is the critical distinction. A meaningful claim is one that can be wrong.

Composite constructs such as QALYs do not fail in this sense. They persist regardless of outcome because they are insulated by assumptions. They are recalculated, not refuted. That is why they cannot support learning. The evolution of objective knowledge regarding therapy impact in disease areas is an entirely foreign concept. By re-centering formulary review on single-attribute, measurable claims, health systems regain control of evaluation. Decisions become grounded in observable change rather than modeled narratives. Evidence becomes something that accumulates, rather than something that is re-generated anew for every submission.

THE PATH TO MEANINGFUL MEASUREMENT

Transitioning to meaningful measurement does not require abandoning current processes overnight. It requires reordering them. The essential change is not procedural but conceptual: measurement must become the gatekeeper for arithmetic, not its byproduct.

The first step is formal recognition that not all numerical outputs constitute evidence. Health systems must explicitly distinguish between descriptive analyses and evaluable claims. Numbers that do not meet measurement requirements may inform discussion but cannot anchor decisions.

The second step is restructuring submissions around explicit claims rather than models. Each submission should identify a limited number of therapy impact claims, each defined by attribute, population, timeframe, and comparator. Claims must be unidimensional by design.

Third, each claim must be classified as manifest or latent. This classification determines the admissible measurement standard and prevents inappropriate mixing of scale types.

Fourth, measurement validity must be assessed before any arithmetic is permitted. For manifest claims, this requires confirmation of ratio properties. For latent claims, this requires Rasch-based measurement with demonstrated invariance.

Fifth, claims must be supported by prospective or reproducible protocols. Evidence must be capable of reassessment, not locked within long-horizon simulations designed to frustrate falsification.

Sixth, committees must be supported through targeted training in representational measurement principles, including Rasch fundamentals. Without this capacity, enforcement cannot occur consistently.

Finally, evaluation must be iterative. Claims are not accepted permanently. They are monitored, reproduced, refined, or rejected as evidence accumulates.

These steps do not reduce analytical rigor. They restore it.

TRANSITION REQUIRES TRAINING

A transition to meaningful measurement cannot be achieved through policy alone. It requires a parallel investment in training, because representational measurement theory is not intuitive and has never been part of standard professional education in health technology assessment, pharmacoeconomics, or formulary decision making. For more than forty years, practitioners have been taught to work within frameworks that assume measurement rather than demonstrate it. Reversing that inheritance requires structured learning, not informal exposure.

At the center of this transition is the need to understand why measurement must precede arithmetic. Representational measurement theory establishes the criteria under which numbers can legitimately represent empirical attributes. These criteria are not optional. They determine whether addition, multiplication, aggregation, and comparison are meaningful or merely symbolic. Without this foundation, committees are left evaluating numerical outputs without any principled way to distinguish evidence from numerical storytelling.

Training must therefore begin with scale types and their permissible operations. Linear ratio measurement applies to manifest attributes that possess a true zero and invariant units, such as

time, counts, and resource use. Latent attributes, by contrast, cannot be observed directly and cannot be measured through summation or weighting. They require formal construction through a measurement model capable of producing invariant units. This distinction is the conceptual fulcrum of reform, because it determines which claims are admissible and which are not.

For latent trait claims, Rasch measurement provides the only established framework capable of meeting these requirements. Developed in the mid–twentieth century alongside the foundations of modern measurement theory, the Rasch model was explicitly designed to convert subjective observations into linear logit ratio measures. It enforces unidimensionality, tests item invariance, and produces measures that support meaningful comparison across persons, instruments, and time. These properties are not approximations; they are defining conditions of measurement.

Importantly, Rasch assessment is no longer technically burdensome. Dedicated software platforms developed and refined over more than four decades make Rasch analysis accessible, transparent, and auditable. These programs do not merely generate statistics; they explain why items function or fail, how scales behave, and whether a latent attribute has been successfully measured. Measurement becomes demonstrable rather than assumed.

Maimon Research has developed a two-part training program specifically to support this transition. The first component provides foundational instruction in representational measurement theory, including the historical origins of scale theory, the distinction between manifest and latent attributes, and the criteria that define admissible claims. The second component focuses on application, detailing claim types, protocol design, and the practical use of Rasch methods to support latent trait evaluation.

Together, these programs equip health systems, committees, and analysts with the competence required to enforce measurement standards consistently. Training does not replace judgment; it enables it. Without such preparation, the transition to meaningful measurement cannot be sustained. With it, formulary decision making can finally rest on claims that are not merely numerical, but measurable.

A NEW START IN MEASUREMENT FOR HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

For readers who are looking for an introduction to measurement that meets the required standards, Maimon Research has just released two distance education programs. These are:

- Program 1: Numerical Storytelling – Systematic Measurement Failure in HTA.
- Program 2: A New Start in Measurement for HTA, with recommendations for protocol-supported claims for specific objective measures as well as latent constructs and manifested traits.

Each program consists of five modules (approx. 5,500 words each), with extensive questions and answers. Each program is priced at US\$65.00. Invitations to participate in these programs will be distributed in the first instance to 8,700 HTA professionals in 40 countries.

More detail on program content and access, including registration and on-line payment, is provided with this link: <https://maimonresearch.com/distance-education-programs/>

DESIGNED FOR CLOSURE

For those who remain unconvinced that there is any need to abandon a long-standing and widely accepted HTA framework, it is necessary to confront a more fundamental question: why was this system developed and promoted globally in the first place?

The most plausible explanation is administrative rather than scientific. Policy makers were searching for an assessment framework that could be applied under conditions of limited empirical data while still producing a determinate conclusion. Reference-case modeling offered precisely this convenience. By constructing a simulation populated with assumptions, surrogate endpoints, preference weights, and extrapolated time horizons, it became possible to generate a numerical result that could be interpreted as decisive. Once an acceptable cost-effectiveness ratio emerged, the assessment could be declared complete and the pricing decision closed. This structure solved a political and administrative problem. It allowed authorities to claim that decisions were evidence-based without requiring the sustained empirical burden demanded by normal science. There was no requirement to formulate provisional claims and subject them to ongoing falsification. There was no obligation to revisit conclusions as new data emerged. Closure could be achieved at launch, rather than knowledge evolving over the product life cycle.

By contrast, a framework grounded in representational measurement would have imposed a very different obligation. Claims would necessarily be provisional. Measurement would precede arithmetic. Each therapy impact claim would require a defined attribute, a valid scale, a protocol, and the possibility of replication or refutation. Evidence would accumulate rather than conclude. Decisions would remain open to challenge as real-world data emerged. From an administrative standpoint, this was an unreasonable burden. It offered no finality.

The reference-case model avoided this problem entirely. By shifting attention away from whether quantities were measurable and toward whether assumptions were plausible, the framework replaced falsification with acceptability. Debate became internal to the model rather than external to reality. Sensitivity analysis substituted for empirical risk. Arithmetic proceeded without prior demonstration that the objects being manipulated possessed the properties required for arithmetic to be meaningful.

Crucially, this system required no understanding of representational measurement theory. Committees did not need to ask whether utilities were interval or ratio measures, whether latent traits had been measured or merely scored, or whether composite constructs could legitimately be multiplied or aggregated. These questions were never posed because the framework did not require

them to be posed. The absence of measurement standards was not an oversight; it was functionally essential.

Once institutionalized, the framework became self-reinforcing. Training programs taught modeling rather than measurement. Guidelines codified practice rather than axioms. Journals reviewed technique rather than admissibility. Over time, arithmetic without measurement became normalized as “good practice,” while challenges grounded in measurement theory were dismissed as theoretical distractions. The result was a global HTA architecture capable of producing numbers, but incapable of producing falsifiable knowledge. Claims could be compared, ranked, and monetized, but not tested in the scientific sense. What evolved was not objective knowledge, but institutional consensus.

This history matters because it explains why the present transition is resisted. Moving to a real measurement framework with single, unidimensional claims does not merely refine existing methods; it dismantles the very mechanism by which closure has been achieved for forty years. It replaces decisiveness with accountability, finality with learning, and numerical plausibility with empirical discipline. Yet that is precisely the transition now required. A system that avoids measurement in order to secure closure cannot support scientific evaluation, cumulative knowledge, or long-term stewardship of healthcare resources. The choice is therefore unavoidable: continue with a framework designed to end debate, or adopt one designed to discover the truth.

Anything else is not assessment at all, but the ritualized manipulation of numbers detached from measurement, falsification, and scientific accountability.

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